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I study the institution of avoiding to hire one’s school own PhD grad-
uates for assistant professorships. I argue that this institution is nec-
essary to create better incentives for researchers to incorporate new
information in studies, facilitating the convergence to asymptotic learn-
ing of the studied fundamentals.
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The job market of economists features the dislike of academic
inbreeding, the decision of a school to hire one of its own graduates
for tenure-track positions. This is usually perceived as “rules of the
game” and as a requirement for a “good” PhD program, without
much contemplation about how academic inbreeding hurts the de-
partment2. This paper argues that such a commitment is a necessary 2 Hugo Horta, Francisco M. Veloso,
and Rócio Grediaga. Navel gazing:
Academic inbreeding and scientific
productivity. Management Science, 56:
414–429, March 2010
response to the organization of educational process: it aligns the re-
search incentives towards the fastest comprehension of researched
phenomena.
Corporate world is not as averse to inbreeding as academia. One
reason is the relatively higher significance of company-specific skills
in corporate world3: there would be no reason for hiring students 3 Boyan Jovanovic and Yaw Nyarko.
Learning by doing and the choice of
technology. Econometrica, 64(6):1299–
1310, 1996
from other universities if their research were unapplicable to the
faculty’s. Another crucial difference is that in academia the final cri-
terion of judgement of one’s value—whether one is right or not—
is in the process of perpetual discovery by judges as well as the
judged. Because of this difference, when decision is made about
the research’s value, the researcher must not know the opinion of the
decisionmaker4. 4 This argument applies also to the
blind review process: an author, know-
ing in advance who will referee the
paper, has an incentive to bias the fi-
nal version towards the opinion of the
referee, which might not be socially
optimal. Knowing the referee’s identity
after the submission will similarly affect
the author’s behavior after getting a
revise-and-resubmit decision.
The Model
The model I use is a one-period game. There are three research
departments, hereafter referred to as Faculties, who are interested
in getting closer in a quadratic sense to the true value of a certain
fundamental5. I denote this fundamental by A ∈ R. Faculty i has 5 Physicists of medieval times were
estimating the size of the Earth, the
distance to the Sun, and the speed of
light. Modern economists are estimat-
ing, among others, the time discount
factor, the risk aversity coefficient and
the socially optimal unemployment
rate.
a signal about the value of fundamental fi = A + ei, where ei ∼
N(0, 1/η).6
6 Normality here is used only to exploit
the convenience of the implied formula
for Bayesian update.
Each Faculty trains one Student7, indexed by almae matres. Training
7 Masculine pronouns shall denote
Faculty agents, and feminine pronouns
shall denote Student agents hereafter.
exposes Student i to the value of her Faculty’s signal fi. Students
simultaneously choose their research positions, a value ri ∈ R. After
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that, Faculties use research positions to decide who to hire. Faculty j
prefers to hire a student whose research is closer to A:
Faculty j hires arg min
i
E
[
(ri − A)2| f j
]
= arg min
i
(ri − f j)2 + 1η .
Since Faculty does not know A, he uses the second best thing he
has—his own signal; let a coin toss resolve ties.
Students have lexicographic preferences over placement in the
following sense. They all prefer getting placed to 1 more than getting
placed to 2, and getting placed to 2 is better for them than getting
placed to 3. Moreover, they are eager to forego all chances of getting
accepted to a lesser Faculty if that increases the chances to get placed
to a better-ranked Faculty8. This makes the labor market function 8 This is a strong assumption, and it is
used for clarity.sequentially: first Faculty 1 chooses the ascendant, then Faculty 2
chooses between two of those who were not offered a position in
1, and finally the last Student joins the Faculty 3. The chance to get
hired by the most preferred Faculty is then
P(i hired by 1| fi, si) = P
(
(ri − f1)2 =
3
min
k=1
(rk − f1)2|si, fi
)
,
and chances to get hired by other faculties have similar structure9. 9 Here I intentionally do not write down
the precise form of the maximized func-
tion, as we will use the lexicographic
preference assumption to solve by
dominance.
Students choose the research position ri to get the best placement
they can based on their Faculty’s signal fi and their private signal
si = A+ ξi, ξi ∼ N(0, 1).10
10 ei and ξ j are assumed to be mutually
independent. The signals of faculties in
real world are correlated through read-
ing and writing in same journals and
communicating on same conferences.
This, however, will only complicate the
policy choice formulas. The variance of
1 is a normalization.
The social planner’s choice is to minimize the variance of the
most precise research. Since research ri can only depend on signals fi
of the Faculty and si of the Student, the variance-minimizing research
is the linear combination of fi and si, with weights of
η
1+η and
1
1+η .
This produces a ri with mean of A and variance of 11+η < min(1,
1
η ).
Thus, at first-best, the squared deviation of research from A is on
average better than it was at the beginning of the game.
The pure strategy equilibrium is the collection of research pol-
icy decisions
〈
r∗i
〉3
i=1 (Student j chooses r
∗
j in equilibrium) and esti-
mates of chance of hiring
〈
p∗ij
〉3
i,j=1
(Student i has p∗ij probability of
getting hired by Faculty j in equilibrium) for every 〈 fi, si〉3i=1 tuple of
signals such that:
• r∗i delivers the maximal element of the placement preferences
of Student i conditional on observing fi and si, and rationally
believing in actions of other Students r∗−i;
• p∗ij are consistent with the optimal decision of Faculties.
in pursuit for impeccable veracity 3
When academic inbreeding is allowed, Student 1 can guaran-
tee herself a placement to 1 by choosing r1 = f1. By lack of atoms in
the assumed signal structure, the chance of another school’s student
to choose exactly ri = f1 is zero, and therefore Students 2 and 3 have
zero chance of getting hired to 1, no matter how they choose ri. Thus,
2 can only get to Faculties 2 and 3, and since 2 observes f2, he can
too choose r2 = f2, guaranteeing herself a placement to 2. Now, no
matter how 3 chooses r3, his placement will be in 3.11 Therefore, with 11 That is, Student 3, in principle, can
choose the optimal mixture of s3 and f3
as her research, but she might as well
choose r3 = 0, or stay with r3 = f3. She
will choose r3 = f3 if there’s more than
one student from at least one faculty,
no matter which. This refinement of
“threat of unemployment” will make
the equilibrium unique.
academic inbreeding there is an equilibrium where r∗i = fi, p
∗
ii = 1
and no scientific progress is happening.
When academic inbreeding is not allowed in Faculty 1, p∗11 =
0, and Student 1 can only be employed by 2 or 3. Student 1 would
rather be employed by 2, and therefore chooses r1 to minimize
E[(r1 − f2)2|s1, f1] = E[(r1 − A)2|s1, f1] + 1η ,
which results in r1 =
η f1+s1
η+1 , the first-best value of her research.
Student 2 can be employed by 1, 2 or 3, and she would rather be
employed by 1. She chooses her research to minimize
E[(r2 − f1)2|s2, f2] = E[(r2 − A)2|s2, f2] + 1η ,
which results in r2 =
η f2+s2
η+1 , again the first-best value of her research,
and same holds for Student 3. Thus, just the commitment by Faculty
1 to not to employ his own students is sufficient to move12 the equi- 12 The choice to abstain from academic
inbreeding by Faculty 1 improves the
precision of it’s own newly hired Stu-
dent ex ante. Therefore, the commitment
of Faculty 1 is individually rational.
The decision to introduce the academic
inbreeding aversion is endogenous.
librium outcome from no development of precision of knowledge
about A to first-best precision of knowledge about A.
This result would not be possible with just two schools, as the
choice of research policy would not affect the allocation of students.
Similar results obtain if students would prefer to stay in alma mater;
but in order to abandon the trap of repeating the research of the
faculty it would be necessary is that all schools, not only the best
ones, do not hire their own students.
Discussion and Conclusion
The assumption about students’ preferences is unusual and
very strong. We do need it for the argument of dominance solvability
to work, but it is not necessary for equilibrium existence. Moreover,
it is obvious that the more a student would prefer to stay in her own
school, the stronger are the incentives to bias the research decision
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towards the faculty’s opinion, since it’s used to determine the wor-
thiness of the candidate. Were there some weights with which stu-
dents were weighing chances of acceptance to different schools, these
weights would affect the student’s decision, pulling it away from the
first-best choice of research position. This assumption, therefore, is
not crucial13 to the finding that inbreeding undermines the research 13 In current form, it has some risk-
loving flavor to it: any Student would
prefer to get into Faculty 1 with a
small probability and work for Faculty
3 with the rest of probability rather
than guarantee herself a placement
to Faculty 2. However, it is not just
the variance that student like, it’s the
exposure to better future, so “risk-
loving” is not an appropriate term for
this behavior.
process. However, without this assumption the commitment of Fac-
ulty 1 to abstain from academic inbreeding might stop being credible:
Student 1 would exhibit better research on average than Student 2
even in the symmetric framework, since Student 2 will somewhat
bias her research towards the research of her Faculty, a thing she
would not do in lexicographic preference setting.
The assumption of identical distribution of signals is also
strong. One would argue that since all students would like to join
faculty 1, eventually faculty 1 will feature a better precision of fac-
ulty signal than, say, faculty 2.14 Of course, had faculties cared about 14 Observe that this is not true in the
baseline model: all research choices
have identical precision.
the precision of the signal at each period of an analogous dynamic
infinite-time game, and were they endowed with different own signal
precision or differently able students, then attractive faculties might
be interested in hiring their own graduates from time to time. Partic-
ularly, assume faculty 1’s students had the variance of their signals of
1
2 ; then the variance of socially optimal choice of their research would
be 12+η , which is less than what can deliver any other student
15—and 15 One could treat the variance of the
signal as the level of effort, introduce
increasing costs of effort, and observe
how academic inbreeding diminishes
incentives for exercising effort.
this exacerbates in dynamic setting. The problem of how to make
students of 1 to take into account their own signal persists.
Banning academic inbreeding improves student incentives to-
wards choosing their research positions at first-best levels. Were
faculties evaluating their own students, they would be creating incen-
tives that biase the research policy towards the faculty’s own opinion
more than necessary. The described mechanism has nothing to do
with moral hazard on the side of employers, which is usually used
when arguing against academic inbreeding from ethical points and
long-run signaling reasons.
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